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Dreyer: Taxation of Boot Distributions: A Return to Bedford?

TAXATION OF BOOT DISTRIBUTIONS:
A RETURN TO BEDFORD?
Gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property generally is
recognized for federal income tax purposes.' However, section
354(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides an exception:
No gain or loss will be recognized if, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, stock or securities of one corporation are exchanged solely
for stock or securities of another corporation that is a party to the
reorganization. 2 Not all reorganizations, however, involve an exchange solely of stock or securities. In acquisitive reorganizations
shareholders of the acquired corporation also customarily receive
cash or other property in exchange for their stock. The receipt of
this additional consideration, commonly referred to as "boot," converts an otherwise tax-free transaction into a partially taxable one:
If any gain is realized, it is recognized to the extent of the boot received. 3
1. I.R.C. § 1001(c) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the
entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized."
2. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) defines "reorganization" as comprising mergers, consolidations, acquisitions by a corporation of the stock or assets of another corporation,
recapitalizations, and changes in identity, form, or place of organization. The rationale for the reorganization provisions is set forth in Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(b) (1955)
and 1.1002(c) (1957). The Court of Claims has explained:
[Clertain transactions constitute corporate readjustments and are not the
proper occasion for the incidence of taxation. Congressional policy is to free
from tax consequences those corporate reorganizations involving a continuity
of business enterprise under modified corporate form and a continuity of interest on the part of the owners before and after, where there is no basic
change in relationships and not a sufficient "cashing in" of proprietary interests to justify contemporaneous taxation.
King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam)
(adopting opinion of Comm'r Bernhardt).
3. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) provides:
(1) Recognition of gain
If(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the fact
that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of property permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain but also of other property or money,
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Taxation of this gain is governed by section 356(a)(2), which
provides that if the exchange "has the effect of the distribution of a
dividend," the recipient's recognized gain must be taxed as ordinary income to the extent of his or her ratable share of accumulated earnings and profits.4 Otherwise it is taxed at the more favorable capital gains rate. 5 Determining when a boot distribution
pursuant to a corporate reorganization is a dividend distribution

within the meaning of section 356(a)(2) has puzzled courts, and no
test or method of analysis has yet gained general acceptance.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently confronted
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount
not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such
other property.
4. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) provides:
(2) Treatment as dividend
If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there shall be treated as a dividend to each
distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is
not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and jrofits of
the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any,
of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the
exchange of property.
5. If the recognized gain is not treated as a dividend, it is "treated as gain
from the exchange of property," id., thus qualifying for capital gains treatment. See
I.R.C. §§_1001(c), 1202, 1221-1223.
The following example demonstrates the application of §§ 354(a)(1) and 356(a).
Mr. Shareholder owns 75% of the outstanding stock in corporation A, which has
$100,000 in accumulated earnings and profits. In a corporate reorganization, he exchanges his stock in corporation A for stock in corporation B. The gain he realizes on
the transaction is $150,000. Because the transaction merely involves an exchange of
stock, this gain is not recognized for tax purposes unless and until he disposes of the
stock in corporation B. But if instead he receives stock in corporation B worth
$100,000 and cash of $50,000, the transaction becomes partially taxable. Two questions arise: (a) How much gain is subject to tax? and (b) Is the gain taxed as ordinary
income or as a capital gain? In the above example, although the gain realized is
$150,000, § 356(a)(1) limits the amount of gain presently taxable to the amount of
boot received, $50,000. If the boot distribution is determined to have the effect of a
dividend, it is deemed, under the definition of dividend in I.R.C. § 316, to be a distribution out of earnings and profits. Section 356(a)(2) limits the amount of boot subject to
dividend treatment to the shareholder's ratable share of the accumulated earnings
and profits of the corporation. In this example, the boot Mr. Shareholder received would
be fully taxable as a dividend because it is less than $75,000, his ratable share of
earnings and profits. If, however, Mr. Shareholder's share of the earnings and profits
had only amounted to $40,000, then only $40,000 would be taxed as ordinary income
and the balance of the boot payment, $10,000, would be taxed at the more favorable
capital gains rate.
This Note addresses the issue in question (b) above: What is the appropriate
standard by which a court should determine whether or not the distribution of boot
has the effect of a dividend?
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this issue in Shirnberg v. United States. 6 The court concluded that
the boot distribution should be treated as a dividend if it would
have been taxed as a dividend had the distribution been made by
the acquired corporation before or in the absence of reorganization. 7 This Note asserts that Shimberg effectuates a return to the
now-discredited automatic-dividend rule: 8 The dividend-equivalence test adopted in Shimberg should be rejected in favor of the
standard formulated by the Eighth Circuit in Wright v. United
States. 9
SHIMBERG V. UNITED STATES

Publicly Held CorporationSwallows Closely Held Corporation
The taxpayer, Mandell Shimberg, Jr., owned 66.8% of the
stock in La Monte-Shimberg Corporation (LSC), a closely held corporation engaged in home construction and sales. LSC's corporate
existence terminated when it merged with MGIC Investment Corporation (MGIC), a publicly held corporation 10 engaged in the financial guarantee business.' 1 The LSC shareholders received pro
rata $625,000 in cash and 32,132 shares of MGIC common stock in
exchange for their LSC stock. In addition, 32,132 shares were
placed in escrow to be delivered to the former LSC shareholders
in five years if conditions of the agreement were met. Shimberg received $417,449 plus 21,461 shares of common stock and an equal
6.

577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979).

7. Id. at 288.
8. The Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S.
283 (1945), is the source of the automatic-dividend rule. See 577 F.2d at 290 & n.19.
Courts increasingly have retreated from a strict application of this rule. See, e.g.,
Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Hawkinson v. Commissioner,
235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 361 U.6. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958). For discussion of Bedford, see text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
9. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). For discussion of Wright, see text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.

10. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832, 834 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd,
577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979).
11. The merger qualified as a reorganization of the statutory merger type. 577
F.2d at 285 (citing I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)). The Treasury Regulations describe a statutory merger as one "effected pursuant to the corporation laws of the United States or
a State or Territory or the District of Columbia." Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1), T.D.
6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61, as amended by T.D. 7281, 1973-2 C.B. 92, as further amended
by T.D. 7422, 1976-2 C.B. 105.
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number of the escrow shares in exchange for his stock.1 2 This constituted less than one percent of MGIC's outstanding stock.' 3
Shimberg's gain on the transaction exceeded the boot he received;
thus the amount of gain taxable under section 356(a)(1) is $417,449,
the amount of boot. 14 The controversy was whether the boot
should be treated as a dividend and taxed as ordinary income or
accorded the more favorable capital gains treatment. Shimberg's
ratable share of LSC's accumulated earnings and profits exceeded
the boot he received. 15 The district court held that since Shimberg
suffered a meaningful reduction in his proportionate interest in the
corporation as a result of the reorganization,' 6 the pro rata boot
distribution is not equivalent to a dividend distribution even in the
presence of sufficient earnings and profits. 17 The court of appeals
rejected this approach and determined that the distribution was
taxable as a dividend because a pro rata distribution to shareholders out of corporate earnings and profits would have been taxed as
a dividend if it had been made prior to or in the absence of the reorganization. ' 8
Shimberg in Perspective
To appreciate properly the different tests applied by the district court and the court of appeals determining dividend equivalence under section 356(a)(2), it is necessary to trace the development of the law from the Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford1 9 through the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Wright v. United States. 20 The corporation in Bedford
exchanged preferred stock for new preferred stock, common stock,
12. 577 F.2d at 285.
13. Id. at 286.
14. Although the amount of gain realized by Shimberg on the transaction is not
disclosed in the opinion, it is clear that it must have exceeded $417,449. Under
I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) the recognized gain is limited to the amount of boot. See notes 3 &
5 supra.
15. "Immediately prior to the merger, the undistributed earnings and profits of
both corporations were in excess of $625,000 each." 577 F.2d at 285 (footnote
omitted). The amount of cash distributed pursuant to the plan of reorganization was
$625,000. If Shimberg's share of earnings and profits had been less than $417,449,
for example, $400,000, then only $400,000 would have been eligible for taxation as
ordinary income under § 356(a)(2). See notes 4 & 5 supra.
16. This test emanates from the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
17. 415 F. Supp. at 836-37.
18. 577 F.2d at 288-89.
19. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
20. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
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and cash pursuant to a recapitalization plan. 2 ' Bedford's estate realized a gain on the transaction, and the cash payment it received
was less than its ratable interest in the corporation's accumulated
earnings and profits. 22 The Supreme Court found that the cash distribution in the presence of earnings and profits is considered a
distribution of such earnings and profits regardless of whether the
corporation's capital is also reduced. 23 The Court held "that a distribution, pursuant to a reorganization, of earnings and profits 'has
the effect of a distribution of a taxable dividend' within § 112(c)(2)
24
[the predecessor of section 356(a)(2)]."
For many years, the broad language in Bedford was interpreted as automatically requiring any gain recognized in connection
with a corporate reorganization to be treated as income taxable as a
dividend to the extent of the shareholder's ratable share of the
distributing corporation's accumulated earnings and profits. 2 5 This
so-called "automatic dividend" rule has been criticized because it is
inconsistent with the statutory language and legislative history of
section 356(a)(2). 2 6 Recently courts2 7 and the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) 28 have retreated from it.
Courts faced with the task of defining dividend equivalence for
purposes of section 356(a)(2) so as not to compel the "automatic
dividend" result have looked to other sections of the Code for
21. A reorganization is defined to include recapitalization. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E).
22. 325 U.S. at 289. Bedford was decided under § 112(c)(2) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c)(2), 53 Stat. 39 (now I.R.C. §
356(a)(2)). The maximum amount of dividend income that could arise under the
predecessor provision of § 356(a)(2) was limited to the amount of boot.
23. 325 U.S. at 292.
24. Id.
25. See B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.34, at 14-117 to -118 (1979). In Rev. Rul. 56-220,
1956-1 C.B. 191, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) formally adopted the
automatic-dividend rule.
26. See, e.g., Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford's Estate, 24
TAXES 266 (1949); Gerson, Boot Dividends and the Automatic Rule: Bedford Revisited, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841 (1970); Moore, Taxation of DistributionsMade in
Connection with a CorporateReorganization, 17 TAX L. REV. 129 (1961); Shoulson,
Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REV. 573 (1965);
Wittenstein, Boot Distributionsand Section 112(c)(2): A Re-examination, 8 TAX L.
REV. 63 (1952).
27. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Hawkinson
v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Sellers v. United States, 42
A.F.T.R.2d 78-6195 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F.
Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
28. See Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118.
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guidance. These courts have realized that the wording of sections
356 and 302 coincide, suggesting a similar test for dividend equivalence in reorganization distributions as that applied to distributions incident to stock redemptions. 2 9 In Ross v. United States, 30
for example, the Court of Claims stated: "The problem of dividend
equivalence usually arises in reorganization cases under § 356 . . .
and in redemption cases under § 302 . . . .The phrase 'has the
effect of the distribution of a dividend' in § 356 . . . is in pari
materia with the phrase 'essentially equivalent to a dividend' as
used in § 302 . . "31 This reasoning justifies using principles developed under section 302 to determine dividend equivalence under section 356(a) although there is no express statutory relationship between the sections, and this has occurred with increasing
frequency. 32 Following its abandonment of the automatic-dividend
rule, the Service cryptically noted that "in appropriate cases" section 302 principles "may serve as useful guidelines" for deter33
mining dividend equivalence under section 356(a)(2).
STOCK REDEMPTION PRINCIPLES:
THE MEANINGFUL REDUCTION TEST

Section 302(b)(2) provides that gain recognized incident to a
stock redemption will be taxed as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset if the redemption is "substantially disproportionate with
respect to the shareholder." 34 A redemption is deemed "substantially disproportionate" if the shareholder's postredemption interest
(a) is less than eighty percent of his or her preredemption interest
and (b) does not exceed fifty percent of the voting power of the
corporation. If the shareholder does not fall within the so-called
29. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973);
Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States,
173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v.
United States. 161 F. Supp. 807, 809 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
30. 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
31. Id. at 797 (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973);
Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Sellers v. United
States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d 78-6195, 78-6197 (N.D. Ala. 1977); King Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States, 418 F.2d 511, 520-21 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam) (adopting opinion of
Comm'r Bernhardt); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807,
809 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
33. Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121, 122.
34.

I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(A).
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safe harbors of section 302(b)(2), he or she may still qualify for
equivpreferred tax treatment "if the redemption is not essentially
5
alent to a dividend" within the meaning of 302(b)(1).
The leading authority interpreting section 302(b)(1) is United
States v. Davis. 3 6 The taxpayer in Davis directly or indirectly
owned fifty percent of the common stock3 7 of the corporation and
all of the preferred stock. The preferred stock had been issued to
enable the corporation to increase its working capital, thereby
qualifying for a pending loan application. After the loan was repaid
the stock was redeemed pursuant to the original understanding.
§ 302 provides in part:
35. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). I..u.
(a) General rule
Ifa corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of section 317(b)),
and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption
shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the
stock.
(b) Redemptions treated as exchanges
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends
Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock
(A) In general
Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) Limitation
This paragraph shall not apply unless immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution is substantially
disproportionate if(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemption
bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately before the redemption
bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as
substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of
the common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting)
after and before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement
of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
if there is more than one class of common stock, the determinations
shall be made by reference to fair market value.
36. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
37. Taxpayer and his wife each owned 25% of the corporation's common stock.
Under I.R.C. § 318(a), an individual is deemed to own, directly or indirectly, stock
owned by his or her spouse and other specified family members for certain purposes,
including that under consideration in Davis. See 397 U.S. at 305 & n.4.
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Holding the distribution taxable as a dividend, the Supreme Court
reasoned:
If a corporation distributes property as a simple dividend, the effect is to transfer the property from the company to its shareholders without a change in the relative economic interests or
right of the stockholders. Where a redemption has that same effect, it cannot be said to have satisfied the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" requirement of § 302(b)(1). Rather, to qualify for preferred treatment under that section, a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation.38
This standard presents difficulties where the reorganization involves two corporations that have merged. The taxpayer changes
status from a shareholder in one corporation to a shareholder in another corporation. The problem is determining what standards
should be used to compare the taxpayer's interest in the old corporation with his or her interest in the new corporation in order to
determine whether a meaningful reduction in proportionate interest has occurred. The district court in Shimberg compared the taxpayer's percentage interest in the acquired corporation before the
merger with his percentage interest in the postmerger corporation.
The court emphasized that prior to the merger, Shimberg, as the
chief executive officer and majority stockholder in LSC, was effectively able to control its operations. However, after the merger he
owned less than one percent of the stock of a large publicly held
corporation whose stock was held by approximately 5,200 shareholders and was traded on the New York Stock Exchange. By using
this basis for comparison, the district court reached the foregone
conclusion that the merger resulted in a meaningful reduction in
Shimberg's interest in the continuing corporation. The court characterized the transaction as a sale by Shimberg and the other LSC
stockholders to MGIC for cash and marketable securities in a publicly held corporation; 3 9 thus the capital gains rate would apply.
Wright v. United States4 0 interpreted the meaningful reduction standard somewhat differently. The taxpayer was the majority
stockholder in three closely held corporations. Under a reorganization plan, two of the corporations were consolidated into a single
38. 397 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
39. See 415 F. Supp. at 836-37.
40. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). For further discussion of Wright, see
Kennedy, Boot received in acquisitive reorganizations:What is the prospectfor capital gains? 41 J. TAx. 288 (1974).
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new corporation. The taxpayer and the other shareholders exchanged their stock in the two consolidated corporations for stock

in the new corporation. Taxpayer also received a promissory note
not issued on a pro rata basis to the other shareholders. The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner that section 356(a)(2)
should be read in pari materia with section 302 to determine
whether issuance of the promissory note had the effect of a dividend distribution. 4 1 It examined whether the taxpayer has suffered
a meaningful reduction in his proportionate interest in the corpora-

tion as a result of the consolidation. Significantly, the court did not
compare taxpayer's preconsolidation and postconsolidation percent-

age interests in the abstract to determine whether he had suffered
a meaningful reduction in interest. The taxpayer's percentage

change of ownership was computed by comparing (a) what his interest in the new corporation would have been if he had received

only stock and no boot with (b) what his interest in the new corporation actually was. Thus the court viewed the transaction as if the
new corporation had redeemed a portion of its stock from taxpayer

after the consolidation and given taxpayer the promissory note in
exchange.
The court found that if taxpayer had not received boot, he
would have owned 85% of the stock in the new corporation. But
because part of the consideration consisted of boot, he owned
61.7% instead. Thus taxpayer's proportionate interest in the new
corporation was reduced by 27.4%; the court deemed this sufficiently meaningful under Davis to qualify for capital gains treat42
ment.
41. 482 F.2d at 605.
42. Id. at 607-10. Taxpayer's change in ownership is computed by calculating
the percentage of stock taxpayer did receive from the total stock he or she would

have received absent the boot distribution. In Wright taxpayer received 61.7% out of
85%, or 72.6% of the amount he would have received absent the boot. Thus taxpayer's interest was reduced by 27.4%. The taxpayer in Wright did not fall within the
safe harbors of § 302(b)(2). Although the percentage reduction in his interest was
more than the statutory 20% (i.e., his postredemption interest was less than 80% of
his preredemption interest) he still owned more than 50% of the voting stock of the
corporation after the redemption. Had the shareholder owned less than 50% of the
voting power of the corporation after the redemption, he would have been protected
under § 302(b)(2) and thus would have been automatically entitled to capital gains
treatment. Section 302(b)(1) is available to the shareholder in circumstances where
the percentage reduction in interest is less than 20%. The taxpayer can argue that his
or her actual percentage reduction is sufficiently "meaningful" to qualify for capital
gains treatment. See text accompanying note 38 supra. As yet no percentage has consistently been found to constitute a meaningful reduction. This question thus continues to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Zinn & Silverman, Redemptions of
Stock Under Section 302(b)(1), 32 TAX LAw. 91, 97 (1978).
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SHIMBERG: A RETURN TO BEDFORD

In reversing the district court decision in Shimberg the Fifth
Circuit recognized that there may be appropriate instances where
stock redemption principles are helpful in interpreting section
356(a)(2) but agreed with the Commissioner that this was not such
a case. 43 The court asserted that to apply stock redemption principles in Shimberg is "akin to hunting ducks with a deer rifle, since
there are fundamental differences between the redemption of stock
in a single corporation and the reorganization of two or more corporations that results in a 'boot.' "44
Without commenting on the soundness of the Wright decision,
the court relied on significant factual differences between Shimberg
and Wright. In Wright there were three separate corporations before merger. Two corporations were merged in such a manner that
the two controlling shareholders owned the newly merged corporation in roughly the same proportionate relationship as they owned
the third corporation. To achieve this result, the plan of reorganization required that one of the shareholders receive a boot payment. The identity of the controlling shareholders was the same
premerger and postmerger although the proportional relationship
changed, and the distribution was not pro rata. In such circumstances even the Shimberg court agreed it was not "illogical" to apply the meaningful reduction test since the transaction could be
viewed as a redemption of a single shareholder's stock by a single
45
corporation.
Conversely, in Shimberg no commonality of ownership existed,
and the boot distribution was pro rata. The court of appeals concluded that applying the meaningful reduction test "would render
§ 356(a)(2) virtually meaningless when a large corporation swallows
a small one in a reorganization, for there will always be a marked
decrease in control by the small corporation's shareholders, unless
46
the same shareholders control both corporations."
This interpretation of the meaningful reduction test misconstrues Wright. A meaningful reduction in a taxpayer's interest is inevitable in the situation described in Shimberg only if the test is
limited to a comparison between the taxpayer's premerger percent43. 577 F.2d at 287.
44. Id. at 290.

45. Id. at 287.
46. Id. at 288.
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age interest in the old corporation with the taxpayer's postmerger
percentage interest in the new corporation. This is how the district
court applied the test in Shimberg.4 7 But this analysis is contrary
to that advocated in Wright. The court in Wright applied the
meaningful reduction test by determining how much stock the taxpayer is entitled to in the surviving corporation if taxpayer receives
only stock and no boot in exchange for his or her stock in the old
corporation. By comparing this amount with the stock taxpayer receives instead, the court calculated the reduction in taxpayer's proportionate interest in the surviving corporation. The transaction is
viewed as a fictional redemption of taxpayer's stock by the newly
formed corporation equivalent to the value of boot. To apply the
Wright analysis to Shimberg, it is necessary to compare Shimberg's fictional and actual ownership in the surviving corporation:
That comparison is between the stock he would have received absent boot and the stock he actually did receive. This difference determines whether the percentage reduction in interest is sufficient
to qualify for capital gains treatment either because it is substanor
tially disproportionate within the meaning of section 302(b)(2)
"meaningful" under Davis' interpretation of section 302(b)(1). 48
Upon rejecting the district court's formulation of the meaningful
reduction test, the court of appeals in Shimberg determined that
the proper standard for dividend equivalence under section
356(a)(2) is whether the distribution would have been taxed as a
dividend if it had been made by the acquired corporation before or
in the absence of the reorganization. If the distribution would have
been taxed as a dividend in such circumstances, a different result is
not warranted merely because the distribution occurs pursuant to
49
reorganization.
The court determined that the meaning of dividend for purposes of section 356(a)(2) is provided by the definition in section
316,50 which defines dividend as "any distribution of property
made by a corporation to its shareholders" out of earnings and
profits; 5 1 every distribution is considered to have been "made out
47. See text accompanying note 39 supra. Accord, Sellers v. United States, 42
A.F.T.R.2d 78-6195 (N.D. Ala. 1977).

48. On the facts of Shimberg, it seems likely that the taxpayer would have qualified for capital gains treatment under the safe harbor provisions of § 302(b)(2). See
415 F. Supp. at 836 n.5.
49. See 577 F.2d at 288-89.
50. Id. at 288.
51. I.R.C. § 316(a).
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of earnings and profits to the extent thereof."5 2 Because his pro
rata share of the premerger earnings and profits of LSC exceeded
the boot Shimberg received, the court concluded that his entire
boot distribution should be treated as a dividend. 5 3
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of section 356(a)(2) is unsupported by statute, legislative history, or judicial interpretation.
Moreover, because the determination of dividend distribution is
reached by focusing solely on the acquired corporation's earnings
and profits without taking into account other circumstances surrounding the boot distribution, this standard effectively converts
any recognized gain into dividend income to the extent that earnings and profits are available. Bedford has been criticized and re54
jected because it produces this same result.
A literal interpretation of section 356(a)(2) does not support the
conclusion that Congress intended automatically to treat boot distributions in the presence of sufficient accumulated earnings and
profits as distributions of dividends. 55 The special circumstances
the boot dividend rules of section 356(a)(2) were designed to govern require an independent dividend test apart from the section
316 definition of dividend. 56 For example, "[i]f a shareholder realized no gain on the exchange, section 356(a) . . .will not tax him,
regardless of the existence of available accumulated earnings and
profits; and, conversely, if there are current (but not accumulated)
57
earnings and profits, there can be no boot dividend."
A comparison of section 356(a)(2) with the provisions of section
356(b) and (e)58 also supports the conclusion that section 356(a)(2)
52. Id. There are exceptions to this rule, but they are not relevant to the situation in Shimberg. See I.R.C. § 316(b).
53. See note 15 supra.
54. See authorities cited in note 26 supra. The Shimberg court denied that its
decision signalled a return to the discredited automatic-dividend rule. 577 F.2d at
290 & n.19.
55. The Court of Claims in Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958), observed: "If Congress meant merely to
say that any boot money at all paid out of earnings should be a taxable dividend, it
used a verbose and complicated way of saying it." Id. at 809.
56. B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 25, § 14.34, at 14-117 to -118. Wright
also asserts that § 316 cannot provide a complete definition of dividend for purposes
of § 356(a)(2). 482 F.2d at 605.
57. Gerson, supra note 26, at 845 (footnote omitted).
58. See I.R.C. § 356, which provides in part:
(b) Additional consideration received in certain distributions
If(1) section 355 would apply to a distribution but for the fact that
(2) the property received in the distribution consists not only of property
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does not automatically give rise to dividend income. In these subsections, Congress explicitly provides for automatic-dividend treatment; the noticeable absence of such language in section 356(a)(2)
substantiates the inference that this section requires a more flexible
59
interpretation.
The court of appeals maintained that the legislative history of
section 356(a)(2)
makes clear that a distribution that would have been a dividend
if made prior to the reorganization is subject to the same treatment when made as part of the transaction.
. . . Indeed, the legislative history of the predecessor to
§ 356(a)(2) offers virtually the same fact situation as an example
60
of a transaction having the effect of a dividend distribution.
A careful reading of the legislative history does not support
61
the court's interpretation. The predecessor of section 356(a)(2)
was designed to eliminate a specific tax-evasion scheme. The
committee reports provide an example of the type of scheme to be
avoided: A corporation that transfers all its assets to a sham corporation, thus enabling surplus cash to be distributed to the shareholders of the transferor corporation. 62 Shimberg is significantly differpermitted by section 355 to be received without the recognition of gain, but
also of other property or money, then an amount equal to the sum of such
money and the fair market value of such other property shall be treated as a
distributionof property to which section 301 applies.
(e) Exchanges for section 306 stock
Notvithstanding any other provision of this section, to the extent that
any of the property (or money) is received in exchange for section 306 stock,
an amount equal to the fair market value of such other property (or the
amount of such money) shall be treated as a distribution of property to
which section 301 applies.
I.R.C. § 356(b), (e) (emphasis added).
59. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,supra note 25, § 14.34, at 14-118.
60. 577 F.2d at 288-89 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
61. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253.
62. The House Report states:
There is no provision of the existing law which corresponds to paragraph (2)
of subdivision (d). This subdivision provides that any amount distributed by
a corporation in connection with a reorganization which has the effect of a
taxable dividend shall be taxed as a dividend and not as a taxable gain.
The necessity for this provision may best be shown by an example: Corporation A has capital stock of $100,000, and earnings and profits accumulated since March 1, 1913, of $50,000. If it distributes the $50,000 as a dividend to its stockholders, the amount distributed will be taxed at the full
surtax rates.
On the other hand, corporation A may organize corporation B, to which
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ent: There is no hint that tax evasion motivated the reorganization.
Furthermore, other courts have found that the legislative history of
section 356(a)(2) is unhelpful in determining its meaning. Justice
Frankfurter's comment in Bedford is illustrative:
The history of the legislation is not illuminating ....
[T]he
reports of the Congressional Committees merely use the language
of the section to explain it. .

.

. We are thrown back upon the

legislative language for ascertaining the meaning which will best
accord with the aims of the language, the practical administration of the law and relevant judicial construction.6 3
The court in Shimberg cited several decisions where boot distributions were held taxable as dividends.6 4 However, these cases
should not have been controlling in Shimberg. Since the cases
cited by the Shimberg court were all decided prior to the Supreme
Court's enunciation of the meaningful reduction test in Davis and
the Wright court's interpretation of this standard, their precedential value is uncertain. Moreover, there are significant factual distinctions between these cases and Shimberg. In the frequently
cited case of Hawkinson v. Commissioner,65 for example, indebtedness of a shareholder to a corporation was cancelled in accordance
with a consolidation plan. The equity interest of the shareholder in
the consolidated corporation was reduced to reflect the cancellation
it transfers all its assets, the consideration for the transfer being the issuance
by B of all its stock and $50,000 in cash to the stockholders of corporation A
in exchange for their stock in corporation A. Under the existing law, the
$50,000 distributed with the stock of corporation B would be taxed, not as a
dividend, but as a capital gain, subject only to the 12 per cent rate. The effect of such a distribution is obviously the same as if the corporation had declared out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits. If dividends are to
be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an amount so distributed should
also be subject to the surtax rates and not to the 12 per cent rate on capital
gain. Here again this provision prevents evasions.
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1923). See also S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1923).
63. 325 U.S. at 290 (citations omitted).
64. 577 F.2d at 288 (citing Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.
1956); Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940); Rose v. Little Inv. Co. 86
F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1936); Commissioner v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1934); King
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam) (adopting
opinion of Comm'r Bernhardt); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl,),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959)).
65. 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956), cited in Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600,
604 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500 n.8 (5th Cir. 1958);
Sellers v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d 78-6195, 78-6197 (N.D. Ala. 1977); King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d. 511, 520 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam)
(adopting opinion of Comm'r Bernhardt); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793,
797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss4/8

14

1979]

OF BOOT DISTRIBUTIONS
TAXATION
Dreyer: Taxation
of Boot Distributions:

A Return to Bedford?

of indebtedness. Because of the boot-the amount of the cancellation of indebtedness-the shareholder received 33,524 shares in
the consolidated corporation rather than 36,180, the number of
shares to which she otherwise would have been entitled. 66 The
Second Circuit held that the boot distribution was equivalent to a
dividend because "the so-called reduction of interest was in reality
a preservation of the economic status quo by a realistic alignment
of ownership in the new corporation to reflect its productive assets." 67 The court in Hawkinson, focusing on the whole transaction, was probably motivated because the reorganization did not
result in any significant change in voting power. A Wright analysis
would likely have yielded a similar result because the shareholder
in Hawkinson only suffered a 7.3% reduction in her interest in the
surviving corporation-arguably not sufficiently meaningful under
Davis to avoid dividend treatment.
The Shimberg court recognized that the effect of a boot payment under section 356(a)(2) must be determined in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding its distribution. 68 But by considering what effect the distribution would have absent reorganization, the Shimberg test fails to give the fact of reorganization any
weight at all. The economic reality of the situation is that, absent
69
reorganization, the boot distribution would not have been made.
If the distribution is analyzed from the perspective of the acquired
corporation only, in circumstances unrelated to reorganization, and
the distribution is made on a pro rata basis, it necessarily will be
treated as a dividend to the extent of the acquired corporation's
earnings and profits. Such a result is a throwback to Bedford.
Generally speaking, a distribution of property to a shareholder
has the effect of a dividend if, as a result, the relative ownership
interests of the shareholders are not affected. 70 Receipt of an ordi66. 235 F.2d at 749-50. Usng a Wright analysis, her equity interest in the corporation was reduced because of the boot by 7.3%.
67. Id. at 751.
68. See 577 F.2d at 290 n.19. The requirement that a court consider all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine when a boot distribution
has the effect of a dividend is similar to the step-transaction doctrine requirements.
Under this doctrine, as the Shimberg court explains, "all parts of a multi-step exchange or reorganization are grouped together to determine the appropriate tax treatment for the entire transaction, if the several steps are an essential and integral part
of the overall plan." Id. at 289. The distribution of cash to LSC shareholders was
clearly an integral part of the overall transaction. The Shimberg court denied that its
decision violates the step-transaction doctrine. Id. at 289-90.
69. See Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot Distributionsin CorporateReorganizations-Determinationof Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAX LAw. 287, 290 (1977).
70. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
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nary dividend leaves the shareholder in the same position vis-a-vis
other shareholders and the corporation as he or she occupied before the receipt of the dividend; as the owner of stock, his or her
right to vote, participate in earnings, and share in the assets of the
corporation upon liquidation remain unchanged.71
Where, however, the distribution does produce a change in
the shareholder's ownership interests or rights, the distribution
should no longer be treated as a dividend. In Idaho Power Co. v.
United States, 72 for example, the holders of six- and seven-percent
preferred stock in a public utility were given the option of either
exchanging their stock for new four-percent preferred stock plus
eight dollars per share, or redeeming their stock at $110 per share.
Two-thirds of the holders elected to exchange their stock. As a consequence of reorganization, the preferred stockholders' status was
drastically changed: Both the rate of return of their investment and
their voting power were substantially reduced. 73 Accordingly, the
Court of Claims ruled that the gains recognized by the preferred
stockholders on the exchange should be taxed as a capital gain and
not as ordinary income.
Although the Shimberg court did not challenge the general
relevance of stock redemption principles for construing section
356(a)(2), it was reluctant to "haphazardly" apply such principles to
the reorganization context. 74 The court's refusal to adopt the meaningful reduction test is based on the incorrect assumption that
whenever applied in situations like that in Shimberg-huge publicly held corporation swallowing small closely held one-the taxpayer will always suffer a meaningful reduction in his or her proportionate interest in the corporation. 75 As previously demon71. These are the most commonly cited attributes of stock ownership. See, e.g.,
Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
72. 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
73. The rate of return was reduced form 6% or 7% to 4%, a reduction of 33% or
42% respectively. Prior to reorganization, separate concurrence of the common
stockowners was unnecessary to authorize issuance of additional preferred stock.
Pursuant to the reorganization plan, however, the voting power of the common stockholders was increased to prohibit future issuance of preferred stock without their
concurrence. Id. at 810.
It is interesting to note that in Idaho Power Co. the taxpayer argued for dividend
treatment while the Commissioner argued for capital gains treatment. The general
pattern was reversed because the corporate taxpayer was claiming a dividends-paid
credit under the predecessor provision of I.R.C. § 243(a)(1). Id. at 808.
74. 577 F.2d at 287, 290 n.18.
75. Id. at 288.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss4/8

16

19791

TAXATION OF BOOT DISTRIBUTIONS

Dreyer: Taxation of Boot Distributions: A Return to Bedford?

strated, 76 however, a proper application of the Wright test does
not compel this conclusion.
As Wright indicates, a change in a stockholder's rights is only
relevant when determined in reference to the rights the shareholder should be entitled to in the corporation that continues to
exist. 77 If, then, the ultimate focus is on the stockholder's position
when the entire transaction is consummated, the order in which
the component parts of the transaction take place is irrelevant. This
principle is illustrated in Zenz v. Quinlivan.78 The taxpayer in
Zenz, owning all the outstanding shares in a corporation, wished to
dispose of them to a competitor. Because the buyer believed the
corporation's retained earnings and profits were a source of potential tax liability, the taxpayer could sell only a portion of her stock.
Shortly after the sale, the acquired corporation distributed substantially all of its retained earnings to redeem the balance of the taxpayer's outstanding shares. The Sixth Circuit held that distribution
of corporate earnings and profits was not dispositive and the effect
of distribution had to be examined in light of all the facts. By
viewing the transaction in its entirety, it became clear that tax79
payer had intended to terminate her interest in the corporation.
Accordingly, the court held that the distribution out of earnings
and profits was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. 0 The
Service has accepted the Zenz rationale, declaring that "it is proper
76.

See text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.

77. 482 F.2d at 607.
78.

213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).

79. Under the provisions of § 302(b)(3), a redemption is treated as a sale of
stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation when "the redemption is in
complete redemption of all of the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder." I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). Gain recognized on the sale or exchange of a capital asset
qualifies for capital gain treatment. I.R.C. §§ 1001(c), 1202, 1221-1223. If the taxpayer in Zenz had disposed of her entire shareholding pursuant to an agreement of
sale, she clearly would have qualified for capital gains treatment on her recognized
gain. In considering the circumstances surrounding the transaction the court concluded that in substance the transaction constituted sale of a capital asset. 213 F.2d
at 917.
80. 213 F.2d at 917-18. Accord, McDonald v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 82 (1969).
In McDonald, the taxpayer owned all the outstanding preferred stock and the majority of the outstanding common stock. Pursuant to an agreement with a publicly held
corporation whose stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, his preferred
stock was redeemed and thereafter he exchanged his common stock for stock of the
acquiring corporation. The court concluded, after considering the transaction as a
whole, that the redemption of the preferred stock resulted in a substantial change in
taxpayer's investment, and accordingly was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Id. at 88-89.
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to rely upon the holding in Zenz that the sequence in which the
events . . . occur is irrelevant as long as both events [the sale and
the redemption] are clearly part of an overall plan." 8'
If the taxpayer in Shimberg had received only MGIC stock,
and a portion of that stock was subsequently redeemed by MGIC,
he would have been entitled to capital gains treatment as long as
the distribution was either substantially disproportionate within the
meaning of section 302(b)(2) or not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1). Thus the Shimberg analysis can lead
to different results depending on the moment when the boot distribution is made. By focusing on the entire transaction Wright and
Zenz assure similar treatment even if the distribution occurs simultaneously with or in contemplation of a merger.
CONCLUSION

Since the enactment of section 356(a)(2)'s predecessor in 1924,
courts have struggled to formulate an appropriate standard for
determining the effect of a distribution of boot within the meaning
of section 356(a)(2). The trend in case law since the mid-fifties has
clearly been towards rejection of a test that automatically leads to
taxation of boot income as a dividend merely because earnings and
profits exist. The Shimberg test is unsatisfactory because it compels
this result.
The appropriate test must take into account all the facts and
circumstances of the transaction: The change in the taxpayer's investment, and the change in his or her rights vis-a-vis other shareholders and the corporation. Such a test is afforded by the Wright
analysis, which views the transaction as if the shareholder first receives stock in the acquiring corporation equivalent to the value of
his or her stock in the acquired corporation. A portion of this
stock, equal to the boot shareholder receives, is considered to have
been fictionally redeemed by the acquiring corporation. The shareholder will qualify for capital gains treatment on the boot received
if, as a result of the fictional redemption, the reduction in his or
her interest in the corporation is either substantially disproportionate within the meaning of section 302(b)(2), or sufficiently meaningful under Davis.
Ivan Dreyer
81.

Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113, 114.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss4/8

18

